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Since its inception, the Revolutionary Armed Forces' (FAR) mission has been to protect and continue the revolution's accomplishments and preserve its status quo. It sees the United States as its principal external threat. To carry out this mission, Cuba's armed forces utilizes multiple doctrines of warfare, see Table 1, eg. conventional, unconventional, and irregular warfare, that are implemented dependent on the existing situation. There exists a conventional doctrine for the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which is based on a "system of scientific criteria" of the principles of military science and operational as well as tactical art, and also that the Cuban forces must be prepared to wage conventional, unconventional and clandestine warfare.1
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Table 1 Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) Doctrines
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A basis for such doctrines can be attributed to the influence and training by the former Soviet Union's military. It can be said that FAR has adopted Soviet military doctrine and organizational principles, with some modifications to suit the smaller size and less sophisticated armament of the Cuban forces.2 This influence is exemplified by the use of an offensive doctrine as used in Cuba's Third World campaigns. However, in an invasion of the island by U.S. forces, the FAR would implement a defensive doctrine that is its centerpiece of military doctrine.
The "War of All the People" doctrine is a defensive strategy that tries to counter an overwhelming invasion force. This strategy envisions an armed populace willing to fight for the defense of the homeland. It was announced in 1980 the creation of the Territorial Troop Militia (MTT) to increase the defense capability of the country. Fidel Castro stated that the MTT was necessitated in order to be "ready for combat operations not only using regular troops, but with the participation of the entire people." 3 Such a strategy of mass mobilization of the populace to assist conventional forces is not a new concept. During the French Revolution, citizens were used to fill the need for soldiers. "In early 1793, 300,000 men were called for, to be conscripted if they would not volunteer, and in August the decree of the levé en masse, putting all fit males at the disposal of the Republic, was promulgated."4 A recent example of this strategy is seen during the Vietnam war where guerrilla fighters assisted the regular forces of the North Vietnamese. This assistance was not the sole reason but only part of the North Vietnamese success. External assistance from the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was vital to the success of this strategy that Cuba presently lacks. "The models for the creation of the MTT and the doctrine of the War of the People were said to be the Soviet partisan movement during World War II in German occupied regions of the USSR and especially the Vietnamese concept of guerrilla struggle against superior forces of foreign occupiers, that is, France and the United States." 5
It remains to be seen if such a strategy would be successful in the event of an invasion from the United States. Without external support present, which was a factor to the success of North Vietnam, Cuba's armed forces will face a difficult struggle with superior number of forces and hardware. Another factor to the implementation of this doctrine is support from the populace to wage such a campaign of attrition. Approximately half of the MTT force is made up of women.6 Heavy losses is a reality to the MTT support component for the FAR and an unwillingness to continue fighting is a even larger possibility.
Notes
1."Defense of the Socialistic Homeland," Verde Olivo, 6 March 1986.
2. Leon Goure. "War of all the People": Cuba's Military Doctrines." In Irving Louis Horowitz. ed. 1995. Cuban Communism: 1959-1995. Eighth Edition. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. p. 601. 3.Ibid p. 604. 4. John Keegan. 1993. A History of Warfare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. p. 350. 5. Raul Castro Ruz, speech at the 40th Anniversary of VE Day. Havana Domestic Service 8 May 1985. 6. Goure, p. 611.
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