Cuban Armed Forces Review: WHAT’S BEHIND CUBA’S MILITARY MANUEVERS?

Last week Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR) abruptly staged military maneuvers for three consecutive days in honor of the 52nd anniversary of the attacks against the Moncada and Carlos Manuel de Cespedes Garrisons, on July 26, 1953.

These tactical maneuvers¹ were deployed in diverse territories of Havana province with the participation of the Gran Unidad de Tanques Rescate de Sanguily, Orden Antonio Maceo (Grand Rescue Tank Unit of Sanguily, Antonio Maceo Order), supported by an assembly of tanks, reinforced with ground artillery, anti-air defense, exploration, engineering, communications, and special forces units along with airplanes and helicopters.

The majority of tanks in the RAM arsenal are aged Soviet T-62 and T-72 MBTs (Main Battle Tanks), which pose no major threat to a "foreign" aggressor, however, quite lethal to a group of unarmed protestors.

The Sanguily tank unit is part of a regiment within an armored division of the Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario) known as the High Command Reserve (Reserva del Alto Mando-RAM). RAM is Fidel Castro’s strategic counterattack reserve, composed of an armored division and all its firepower support units that form a defensive ring around the capital of Havana. The reserve is located in Managua military base near Havana and its mission in wartime consists of being combat ready when the Commander-in-Chief orders their mobilization. This counterattack force was created in the 1960s, based on the Soviet concept of having an important reserve force to be thrust upon the direction, when detected, of an enemy's principal attack, and in which direction the enemy has concentrated his offensive.²

However, are these maneuvers merely a drill to commemorate an anniversary, or in fact a precursor for a possible conflict with emboldened dissident protestors in the streets of Havana reminiscent of China's Tiananmen Square?

Civil demonstrations took place on July 13 along the seaside Malecón highway in Havana by dissidents commemorating the deaths of 41 Cubans who were killed in 1994 when government patrol boats sprayed water hoses and rammed their stolen tugboat as they tried to flee the island was met with a larger group of pro-government demonstrators – Brigadas de Accion Rapida (Rapid Action Brigades), similar to Italy's fascist camicie nere– shouting "Viva Fidel!," and calling dissidents traitors and worms.³

The opposition is becoming more emboldened promising further demonstrations. And there is growing discontent within Cuban society that is being exacerbated by the daily blackouts of more than 12 hours and water shortages plaguing the entire island during the onerous hot summer months,⁴ as well as Hurricane Dennis' recent devastation of 120,000 houses, leveling 15,000 homes, which is fraying Cubans' nerves.⁵

As the ranks of opposition protestors begin to slowly swell en masse, there may come a point where they will out number these shock brigades and police forces, posing a series security problem for the regime and armed forces, if they were to lose control of the streets to the populace.

Havana saw unprecedented rioting and a migration crisis in which 30,000 people set out to sea on rafts as a consequence of blackouts caused by severe economic problems in the summer of 1994.

The RAM was allegedly placed on alert during the "Maleconazo" of August 5, 1994, when hundreds of people spontaneously protested by the seawall in Havana known as the Malecón and adjacent streets, however, the protest was quickly quashed by the Cuban regime's security apparatus.

Furthermore, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, are closely monitoring these developments; studying and deciphering RAM's intentions by its formations, placement of troops and armaments employed.

It is one thing for the armed forces to be drilling in preparation for a phantom foreign invader, and quite the other for the RAM and associated units to be preparing for an armed assault on a populace that is growing steadily disenchanted with the regime, at the brink of a social explosion.

Nevertheless, are we to see the armed forces change its doctrine from a war of all the people (Guerra de Todo el Pueblo) to a war against all of the people in defense of the regime's survival?

Armando F. Mastrapa III is the editor of the Cuban Armed Forces Review Internet Web Site. He received a Master of Arts in Government and Politics from St. John's University (New York City). He has written extensively on Cuban political and military affairs.

© Copyright 2005 Armando F. Mastrapa III. All Rights Reserved. Permission to reproduce, distribute, and/or quote from this work for non-profit, educational purposes is freely granted, always provided that proper reference to the author be included and that this notice accompany copies of a section or more of text. Reproduction and/or citation for profit and/or non-educational purposes is expressly forbidden without prior consent from the author.