by José F. Alfonso

This report concentrates upon Gen. Ochoa and his precipitous fall from grace. The analysis separates the drug-trafficking aspects from the case and focuses upon several "political" questions that were raised in the wake of Gen. Ochoa's arrest, trials, and execution. In sum, these questions addressed possible explanations for the turbulent events of mid-1989. They included allegations of a possible defection by Gen. Ochoa the rise of Ochoa as a rival political figure vis-à-vis Fidel or Raul Castro, and speculation about the emergence of a dissident political faction among the officer corps of the FAR.

On 13 July a terse statement published in Granma noted that former Div. Gen. Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez had been executied. In accordance with the "sentence dictated by the Special Military Court, Case No. 1 of 1989" Ochoa and three others--FAR Capt. Jorge Martínez Valdés, MININT Col. Antonio de la Guardia, and MININT Maj. Amado Padron Trujillo--had faced a firing squad early that day.[2]

Any explanation of the dramatic events of June and July 1989 is, in large part, dependent upon the information that Cuba made public. It is true that the publicity given to both the Ochoa and de la Guardia cases was unprecedented. The details of the cases provide a picture of widespread corruption, unorthodox relations with other countries, and facets of Cuban involvement in narco-trafficking. What is not clear is whether the latter was officially sanctioned or not. (For an analysis of the drug-related aspects of the Ochoa affair, see Section II, "Foreign Policy.")

The information available to outside observers gives little guidance as to which of the political questions would have the greatest explanatory value. Regardless, among the data released by the Cuban leadership there were elements of the Ochoa case which seem to indicate that the Castro brothers had become concerned about Ochoa before many of the subsequent facts were uncovered. The underlying political issues and questions then center around why Ochoa was arrested in the first place and what the nature was of his transgressions that led to this execution.

The Arrest and Charges

On 12 June 1989 the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces announced the arrest and investigation of Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez for serious acts of corruption and dishonest use of economic resources. His case was to be put before a Military Honor Court.[3] The announcement also indicated that no one in either the Communist Party of Cuba or the Revolutionary Armed Forces was to consider himself above the law by "departing from the principles of the Revolution" or by " committing grave moral and legal violations of socialist law."

Ochoa's arrest came shortly after another prominent official, Minister of Transport Diocles Torralba, had been fired. Torralba was subsequently tried on charges of immorality and malfeasance in office; he received a sentence of twenty years. Among observers of events in Cuba, it was suggested that

 

Ochoa and Torralba (sic) in some way opposed the policies of Fidel Castro, like Mr. Castro's refusal to adopt Soviet-style economic and political reforms. [It was] suggested they may also have hatched a plot against the Cuban leader.[4]

Nevertheless, Cuba consistently denied that the two cases were linked; it was insisted that Torralba's case was related to "immoral, dissolute, and corrupt personal behavior. Although the cases differ, people who are implicated had common links with both men."[5] On 14 June 1989 Radio Rebelde announced that Army Gen. Raul Castro would speak at a celebration of the Western Army's twenty-eighth anniversary, to be carried live on radio and television (see the following).

Commentary on the Arrest. Outside of Cuba, there was skepticism about the arrest of Ochoa. In the opinion of former Brig. Gen. Rafael del Pino, who defected from Cuba in May 1987, the arrests were "an emergency step to stem the spread of discontent with President Fidel Castro's leadership."[6] For del Pino, the arrests of Ochoa and Torralba were a means for Castro

 

to rid himself of two independent-minded men while diverting public attention from the island's mounting problems.... Ochoa fulfilled his duty.... Every officer in the armed forces admired him. He was always an austere individual devoted to military life and his hands are not stained with blood. [Torralba was] the best prepared, most intelligent figure in the Cuban government.... Castro used the excuse of corruption to destroy the official [i.e., Torralba] because both he and Ochoa often chose their own course in making decisions.[7]

Another commentary suggested that the emerging conflict between Gorbachev and Fidel Castro might be a relevant factor in the Ochoa case.

 

Ochoa was a pragmatic, nonideological man who was flexible enough to recognize the sense behind the reforms Gorbachev is suggesting. What is more, he, like many other Cuban military officers, was trained in the Soviet Union and had close, continuing ties to Soviet leaders.[8]

Raul Castro 's Speech. The most dramatic reaction to the Ochoa arrest came on the occasion of MINFAR Minister Raul Castro's 14 June speech marking the Western Army's twenty-eighth anniversary.[9]

The FAR leader reassured his audience that they were gathered there to talk about the Western Army and some aspects of bilateral relations with the United States. He also said that "we are going to talk a bit about Ochoa, not everything that everyone is expecting. It is a very long story, and it will be explained."[10]

What was planned as a forty-five minute speech turned into a two and a half hour demonstration of frustration and backpeddling on prime time Cuban television. Raœl Castro appeared disillusioned, highly distracted and seemed barely able to contain himself as he departed from his written remarks to talk about Ochoa. Raul admitted that things had happened, but that "it is not any kind of political problem, or anything like that. " Rather, corruption was the issue and, he added rhetorically, how one falls into that state. Castro also complained about Ochoa's habit of always speaking jokingly and seriously at the same time.[11]

According to Raul, in January 1989, when Ochoa had begun his period of orientation prior to assuming command of the Western Army, Ochoa had asked him whether there were doubts about the appointment. The MINFAR minister admitted that he did have some doubts, particularly in the context of giving Ochoa command of the Western Army. "I no longer want to hear comments by anyone, or any kind of gossip." Then Raul Castro informed Ochoa that he would receive the command on 14 June 1989. Ironically, on the very day that he was to receive the command, Gen. Castro was rationalizing the detention of one of Cuba's most decorated military officers:

 

But one must have...one must not promote oneself with popularity. One must not be saying: That war in Angola, this or that, that we made poor decisions there. He was in Luanda even though he traveled south, he worked here and there. He was involved at the front with all our troops. He was in the thick of things. Comrade Polito was the chief of southern troops and not Ochoa who passed the time away conducting other activities.[12]

Granma Editorials. A front page editorial in Granma on 16 June was the first major press coverage in the regime's campaign to explain the Ochoa-de la Guardia cases to the Cuban public and to shape international public opinion. Despite the long-established trust in Ochoa, it was explained that he had been able to cover up his gradual "moral deterioration." Subsequently, he was said to have corrupted those who worked with him and used them in his "illegal activities." Ochoa had been destined to serve as commander of the Western Army, the sector of the FAR that includes the city of Havana and its environs. However, the decision to appoint Ochoa was delayed due to

 

rumors of moral irregularities in his behavior and possible improper use of resources.... In frank and open discussions...Ochoa was not able to explain some of his behavior, but the preliminary results of the investigation showed enough signs of the seriousness of the events to cause the decision to arrest and submit him to an honor tribunal.[13]

The 16 June editorial went on to say that Ochoa was concerned more with commercial operations than military questions. The general, however, maintained that his actions were justified by the needs of the country and a commitment to internationalist goals. Nevertheless, Ochoa's actions "were the reason for repeated discussions and criticisms on the part of the Minister of the FAR."[14] While charging Ochoa and others with corruption and negligence of duty, the editorial emphasized that the cases involved no serious political questions or offenses:

We must say that...we have not found any evidence that Arnaldo Ochoa and the small group of people in the MINFAR and the MININT who were his accomplices were implicated in political activities or acts of treason against the Revolution.[15]

Regardless, Granma added that immoral and corrupt behavior was a form of treason and that "This type of treason always leads, sooner or later, to political treason." Almost as an afterthought, the 16 June editorial mentions the possible connection of Ochoa and other officials of the MININT with international drug traffickers.[16]

Just six days later, in another Granma editorial, the Cuban government extended its explanation of the Ochoa-de la Guardia cases; now the two were being implicated in drug-trafficking. It was contended that Ochoa had developed a relationship with officials in MININT through the de la Guardia brothers: ' The cooperation of the de la Guardia brothers...helped Ochoa a great deal.. .thus violating all norms, regulations, document controls, and trips strictly established by the MINFAR."[17] The specific concern was the travels of Ochoa's assistant, Capt. Martinez, and his meetings with representatives of the so-called Medellin group in Colombia. It was alleged that Martinez had actually met with the head of that group, Pablo Escobar, in May 1988:

 

This clandestine trip with the use of a false passport to Colombia...is one of the most serious, foolhardy and irresponsible acts committed by Ochoa and the de la Guardia group.... If this official, on active duty, an aide of a known and prestigious chief like Arnaldo Ochoa, had been captured and presented to international public opinion...a shameful series of calamities would have befallen the Revolution and would have been very difficult to deny.[18]

Yet, the 22 June editorial concluded that Ochoa had had little if any success in carrying out any of the alleged projects with representatives of the drug cartel. Indeed, it was said that

 

Ochoa did not have a team. Only one of his collaborators within the MINFAR was in on the secret. He entirely depended on Tony de la Guardia's group and, among them, he had more rivals than sincere collaborators.[19]

The 22 June Granma editorial makes the distinct point that, prior to the arrest, little or nothing was known about drug-trafficking

 

when Ochoa, Martinez, and the de la Guardia brothers were arrested on Monday, 12 June...[i]nvestigations were being made of illicit acts and business, corruption, immorality, and other faults in Ochoa, Patricio and Antonio de la Guardia...[20]

This admission can be viewed in several ways: one is that Cuban leaders were truly unaware of how far either Ochoa or the de la Guardia group had gone; another is that the editorial might be considered the first phase in rewriting history, setting up a rationale whereby the Castros could explain their total ignorance of the drug connections. If the first thesis were true, it raises the question of just what the actual concerns of the regime were. Also, what were those unspecified "faults" and moral lapses which, while not political, "always end up being political" in nature?

Nevertheless, the 22 June editorial presses the drug issue, saying that

 

a previous investigation was in process. Several rumors that came from friends of Cuba suggested there were drug traffickers who had the cooperation of Cuban officials. They also mentioned some complaints about lost merchandise. That was combined with growing charges from the United States of drug trafficking operations in Varadero and in the jurisdictional waters near that point.[21]

Several weeks later, Fidel Castro mentioned yet another aspect of the Ochoa arrest and subsequent investigations, i.e., that not all of the evidence had been made public. In his presentation to the Council of State on 9 July 1989, the Cuban leader stated that

Only a few things were not publicized because they were too unpleasant. These are things that have to do with moral matters that could affect innocent people and turn out to be too scandalous. We decided that those things would not be publicized.

Errors were made, particularly in Ochoa's case. There were violations of certain revolutionary principles and there were errors on an international level that could have done the country a great deal of damage; these errors involved very sensitive issues that were analyzed at the court of honor and during the oral proceedings but not published because they could have created further problems and difficulties, even though they would have had no impact on the decisions that had to be made.[22]

During the summary court martial of Ochoa and the other defendants, the Minister of Justice, Brig. Gen. Juan Escalona Reguera, indicated that not all of the evidence had been presented. For example, only summaries of MINFAR Minister Raul Castro's report to the Military Honor Court were made public. Similarly, the testimony of Patricio de la Guardia had not been released, since "after all, they contribute nothing from the legal point of view."[23]

Thus, outside observers of the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair are left to sift through only the evidence that has been made public by the Cuban government. This, of course, raises even more doubts about the case, and further complicates any conclusive analysis of the reasons for Gen. Ochoa's arrest and execution.

Ochoa: The Career, the Personality

Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez was born about 1930 in the City of Havana. His family were small farmers in the eastern mountains of Cuba. During the Batista era, Ochoa belonged to the Twenty-Sixth of July Movement. By March 1958 he had joined Fidel Castro's Rebel Army in the Sierra Maestra, fighting in the ranks of Camilio Cienfuegos. He participated in the occupation of the city of Santa Clara in central Cuba, a key battle which eventually led to the flight of dictator Fulgencio Batista on 1 January 1959. He also took part in the fighting at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Gir—n) in 1961 as well as in the Struggle Against Bandits (Lucha Contra Bandidos) campaigns to suppress internal rebellions during the early 1960s.

General Ochoa's distinguished military career lasted more than thirty years. The creation of Cuba's national defense structure and many of the foreign policy accomplishments of the Cuban Revolution are often reflected in that career. Some observers state that Ochoa was a close and personal friend of Raul Castro. In 1965 he became a member of the Communist party of Cuba. Ochoa was a member of the party's Central Committee for more than two decades. He attended the War College in Matanzas, Cuba, and was later sent to the Frunze Academy in the Soviet Union. He spoke fluent Russian and Portuguese.

General Ochoa commanded the Central Army in 1960. During the early 1960s, he participated in efforts to create an insurgent opposition in Venezuela. Between 1967 and 1969, he commanded military advisors who trained the army of Congo, Brazzaville. Ochoa served for a period as commander of the Army of Havana and is later mentioned as commander of the Western Army.[24]

At some point in 1975, Gen. Ochoa was transferred to Luanda, Angola, to conduct a critical offensive against the FNLA in which he gained the admiration of both the Soviet and Cuban officer corps. This most likely led to his promotion to Division General in 1976. In 1977 he was named commander of Cuban Expeditionary Forces in Ethiopia under the command of Soviet Gen. Petrov. His field strategies and successes in the battles against the Somalis further impressed the Soviet General Staff.

By 1980, Ochoa's internationalist credentials were beyond reproach. He had become a member of the National Assembly of Popular Power, or Asamblea Nacional de Poder Popular (ANPP), and was head of the Directorate of Combat Training and Centers of Military Studies.[25] Yet another international assignment came when he was sent to Nicaragua (1983-1985) as commander of all Cuban military advisors, in effect to direct military operations against the rebel opposition forces supported by the United States. After he had returned to Cuba in March 1986, Ochoa was appointed vice-minister in charge of Overseas Missions, under the command of Div. Gen. Abelardo Colome Ibarra.[26]

It was at that point that Ochoa became involved once again in the annual Soviet-Cuban-Angolan offensives against the South African-supported rebels of UNITA and was involved in planning sessions among Angola, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. In November 1987 he was appointed Chief of Military Mission in Angola to help defend the southeastern town of Cuito Cuanavale and to plan a successful Cuban-led offensive into southwest Angola along the Namibian border.[27]

In January 1989, in the wake of Cuba's acclaimed military success in Angola, Gen. Ochoa returned home. Pending his appointment as head of the Western Army, he was arrested in June 1989. He was executed in July 1989.

The Career. Over the course of his career, Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa carried out numerous special missions representing the FAR. He was probably Cuba's most experienced military officer in the field, especially in overseas operations, many of which were covert. He participated in Warsaw Pact maneuvers. At some point, along with Div. Gen. Senen Casas Regueiro, he served as an observer on the Vietnamese General Staff.

The honorary title of "Hero of the Cuban Republic" and "Maximo Gomez Order, First Degree" must surely be the apogee of any Cuban official's career in terms of status and prestige. Decrees 250 and 251 of Council of State conferred the titles upon Div. Gens. Abelardo Colome Ibarra and Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez.[28] Colome's award was in recognition of his extraordinary contributions to the insurrection against Batista, to the consolidation of the nation's defense, and for his service in international missions.

Ochoa's award was given for similar accomplishments and contributions to the Revolution. The citation described his successes as a guerrilla fighter, his subsequent assignment to join the forces of Camilo Cienfuego, and his rise to the rank of captain in the Rebel Army:

 

Ochoa Sanchez has fulfilled various internationalist missions in a singular spirit of sacrifice, demonstrating his ideological firmness, valor, [and] talent in serving the cause of national liberation and socialism.

In like manner, the life of comrade Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez is a living example of the qualities and merits of those men of the most humble origins who...cultivate the authentic traits of modesty and sincerity and who enjoy the admiration, the respect, and the admiration of the masses.

The life and career of Ochoa Sanchez were said to deserve recognition and to serve as a

 

stimulus for all fighters, cadres, [and] militant revolutionaries.... The recognition will enable...our people to see its own virtues of honesty disinterest, [and] capacity for sacrifice...synthesized...in Ochoa.[29]

Apart from the decorations awarded by the state, it was obvious that Ochoa was highly respected by his military colleagues for his professional conduct and accomplishments. Although a unanimous indictment of guilt was handed down by the Military Honor Court, many of the forty-seven FAR generals who participated in that court expressed their admiration for Ochoa. Brig. Gen. Lino Carreras Rodriguez commented that he had always "...thought of Ochoa as one of the FAR's best leaders." His successor as advisor of Cuban forces in Nicaragua, Brig. Gen. Nestor Lopez Cuba, recalled "the affection and prestige he earned among us.... Nonetheless, we were aware--as other comrades have stated--of his virtues and defects." Brig. Gen. Gustavo Chui Beltran perhaps spoke for others:

 

when we learned in Angola that the FAR minister, who is our commander-in-chief, had designated Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa as mission commander, we were all very happy. We all regarded Ochoa as an excellent man, a comrade, and a charismatic, decisive officer. We all admired him and held him in high regard.[30]

Who Was Ochoa? The events of June-July 1989 not only spotlighted Ochoa's career, accomplishments, and status within the Cuban Revolution; they also provided a unusual glimpse of Ochoa, this "Hero of the Republic." Military officers in Cuba are seldom heard from and normally do not make public statements. To know Ochoa prior to 1989 was at best a difficult task. Based on his career path and scarce information, many observers had concluded that Ochoa was in some ways "a pragmatic, nonideological man who was flexible."[31]

As described above, Ochoa was perceived as serious and dedicated, particularly in view of his feats on the field of battle and apparent sense of obligation to his military colleagues. This perception is underscored by his colleagues throughout the court-martial procedures. On the other hand, according to the regime, Ochoa was also seen as flippant, irreverent, and iconoclastic. Raul Castro in his report to the Military Honor Court provided another perspective on Ochoa's behavior:

 

I must admit in all sincerity that the evidence of the violations and irregularities Ochoa was committing in carrying out his duties as chief were mixed and confused by his temperament and some particular characteristics of his personality that made it difficult to separate his true feelings from his constant jokes. We later clearly established how Ochoa turned his dirty language and his habit of boasting about anything into a tool to justify to us--in between serious remarks and jokes--his absurd ideas. He tried to pass them off as jokes out of fear of the listener's reaction to his true thoughts, which he was seriously expressing.32

Previously, during the now infamous 14 June speech to the Western Army, Raul Castro had disparaged Ochoa, but the Cuban leader was also somewhat puzzled by his one time protege:

 

The officer--I will and say the general--whom I reprimanded the most, be it at a family dinner, in the hallway--is named Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez.... He was always gossiping, joking. One never knew when he was talking seriously or jokingly; he would sometimes combine the two. Even with Ochoa, how many talks did I have with him? In the middle of the Cuito Cuanavale battle, he would say I am doing a little business here and there. I would tell him: Listen Ochoa, do you realize what you are telling me? He would answer: Chief, I am just kidding. I used to talk a lot with Ochoa. I would ask him: Are you talking to me seriously now, or are you kidding?[33]

In his own way, Fidel Castro echoed Raul's puzzlement, relating that Ochoa had made a habit of talking seriously and of joking.... Raul would tell him: Just go about your military tasks.... You must devote yourself to your military tasks.[34]

At the Military Honor Court, Div. Gen. Carlos Fernandez Gondin alluded to an Ochoa who was more than he appeared to be on the surface, even though publicly, Fernandez' assessment coincided with that of Raul Castro:

 

It is true that Ochoa's conduct has always heavily influenced the complexities of his personality. For several years, his charismatic appeal coexisted with traces of boastful pedantry.... But much more important...from an ideological point of view, is the image of him, opening himself up at a certain point in his career to influence, which is described in detail in the minister's report.[35]

A rather bizarre facet of the Ochoa case was the official assessment of the military officer's conduct and attitude. In strong terms, he was accused of hiding aspects of his activities "beneath certain features of his personality" which made it difficult to discern his "true thoughts." In other words, Ochoa may have been dissimulating or "wearing the mask." He would use his sense of irony or crude humor to disguise his criticisms of the current system or certain policies.[36]

The idea of the mask has been mentioned in other contexts. This particular thesis concludes that much of the population, including members of the government elite, conforms to the current system for the purpose of survival. Nevertheless, many may hold values and perspectives distinct from those advocated by the Castro-led government. Thus, it is probable that many people in Cuba lead a type of double-life. It is possible that this "pretence" manifested itself in Gen. Ochoa's behavior, i.e., the serious professional soldier constantly joking and acting irreverently.

It was also stated that early on in his career, Ochoa was the FAR officer most criticized for his "faults," but that his behavior had been excused, since it was concluded he was being superficial and was immature. Nevertheless, very little specific information was released by the Cuban government as to the nature of Ochoa's alleged personal faults. Nor was there any explicit information given about the criticisms directed at Ochoa by his superiors.

Again, more questions are raised than answered: Why were stronger disciplinary measures not used earlier in Ochoa's case? To what degree did Ochoa's conduct engender distrust, and when? Or, are the post-arrest criticisms part of the rationalization for arresting the recipient of Cuba's highest order? Why, if Ochoa was the most criticized, the most superficial, did the Castros continue to rely upon him in critical overseas situations? And further, why, after his allegedly poor performance in Angola, did the Castros slate Ochoa to head the Western Army command as early as December 1988?[37]

The Investigation

It is not entirely clear why, how, or even when the investigation of Gen. Ochoa and the other defendants began. The Castros indicated that an investigation had begun in March or April 1989, two months before Ochoa's arrest. Cuba maintained that the investigation, at first, was discrete and cautious and was highlighted by the two meetings among Raul Castro, Gen. Ochoa and other members of the investigating team. The first took place on 29 May 1989 and lasted three hours. Both Army Corps Gen. Abelardo Colome Ibarra and Div. Gen. Ulises Rosales del Toro were present. It was concluded at the first meeting that it was not possible to entrust the command of the Western Army to Ochoa. The second meeting, perhaps requested by Ochoa, occurred on 2 June 1989 between only Castro and Ochoa. In both cases, it was announced that the transcripts were not to be made public.

The Conversations. Much of what happened prior to the arrest of Gen. Ochoa was explained by Raul Castro in his rambling speech on 14 June. The MINFAR minister related the series of meetings and discussions with Ochoa and, in the process, shed light on the delicate nature of the burgeoning affair.

Regarding the first long meeting, Raul Castro recounted how he had asked him:

 

Do you want to confess? Confess so that you can see what kind of problem you have. Do you want me to remove Colome and Ulises from the meeting so that you can speak to me alone? No. I spoke for three hours there with papers, documents, this, that, everything. Be reasonable, remember everything I told you. No.

He seemed totally sincere when, after the first and long conversation with him, I hugged him and told him that no matter what happened, we would be his brothers--today, tomorrow, and always.

Two or three days later, Ochoa and Raul Castro met alone:

I was very pleased. I thought he would tell me everything he was mixed up in, about all his problems. We could critique him. We would not place him in the Western Army but he could stay here with me. I even offered him the position of being my advisor.... He came to the famous meeting alone. I said, the man at last is going to explain everything. This will simplify everything. I'll inform comrade Fidel and the others who brought up this matter, the other comrades, and--guess what--he said a few more things.[38]

It is apparent that during the meetings there had been some discussion about Fidel Castro or his leadership. Raœl intimated that there was criticism of Fidel Castro:

 

I said to Colome...Why don't they invent all those things against you? Why don't they say those things against you? Naturally, they know against whom they are doing it. Our living symbol, as a human being with his defects and the defects we all have, some more than others, the most important symbol we have is called Fidel Castro!

One day there was a discussion with a charlatan [i.e, Ochoa]. I sent for him and said: Listen, Fidel is our father. [Pounds on podium three times]. l don't know what you're talking about, whether or not the commander-in-chief said this. I think; I can reason. He is accessible. I can say: Look, commander, this is what I think. We can discuss things. But some half-wit a liar who says garbage.... [does not finish sentence] I could not.... [does not finish sentence]. I had to call him in here. I calmed down. I drank a cup of tea and I waited for him.... I began to talk to hum and I said: Listen, if Fidel Castro had not been born, if Fidel Castro.... I told him: Look if Fidel Castro had not been born, neither you nor I would be sitting here because he produced what Che called the social cataclysm. A true revolution was produced from this social cataclysm.[39]

In his 14 June address, MINFAR Minister Raul Castro explained that after the lengthy meetings it was concluded that Gen. Ochoa "was no longer the rebel soldier, the invader of Camilo's column, the internationalist in Venezuela, the commander of our troops in Ethiopia." Even so, as related by Raul in his speech, it appeared that Raul Castro was attempting to salvage the situation, thinking that Ochoa might be rehabilitated with help. "We believed that we should do everything possible so that the Revolution and the Armed Forces would not lose a comrade with his background and accomplishments."

While Raul Castro was groping for a way to retrieve Ochoa and limit the political and diplomatic damage, there was also concern about Ochoa's possible defection

 

we had evidence, but no proof yet, of serious moral flaws in his character that could indicate--if the evidence were true-- an ethical degradation which led us to fear he might desert.... It became necessary for the FAR to assign him to a task that would keep him under control.[40]

The Process. Despite initial thoughts of rehabilitating Ochoa, the campaign to make the case against him was continued in a letter on the front page of Granma. Division Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frias accused Ochoa of "betraying" the faith placed in him, the party, the FAR, and Fidel Castro.[41] Coinciding with Cintra Frias' letter, Granma began to refer to the Ochoa-de la Guardia case as a drug-trafficking case. The newspaper of the Communist party of Cuba assessed the situation on 22 June, indicating that only a very approximate picture of what had happened could be presented. It was stated that Ochoa and Antonio de la Guardia had cooperated little in clarifying the issues and "only reluctantly" did they admit any responsibility. Other participants, according to Granma, had cooperated much more, although not always with total candor.[42]

At the Council of State session in July, Fidel Castro recounted whom Ochoa had involved in the drug aspects of his "operations" and why he had not been discovered earlier:

 

Ochoa talked with only one officer. Very little was known about Ochoa, just some moral aspects and no criminal aspects. At any rate, these were not penal crimes but moral crimes. Reports about Ochoa's behavior were starting to come in from various sources.[43]

Fidel Castro rhetorically asked whether the investigation would have uncovered the situation if the Ochoa problem had not arisen. Indeed, "we were far from supposing these two activities could be linked."

Clearly, for the Castro brothers the whole affair had become a difficult political problem both domestically and internationally. How to handle Ochoa became a priority item. The Cuban leader explained that everyone involved acted cautiously with Ochoa. The moral issues were linked to other reports, and a pattern of irregular activities emerged. This set of circumstances, Fidel Castro explained, led to the postponement of Ochoa's appointment as head of Western Army: "When MINFAR informed me of these activities, particularly the moral ones...they precluded Ochoa's designation as chief of the Western Army."

It is possible that the Castros had hoped to clear up the Ochoa matter without going public:

 

At the time...I thought of the speculation that would be unleashed worldwide, the scandal that would ensue if, because of these problems, Ochoa had to be stripped of his medals, degraded, fired, expelled from the Armed Forces, or incarcerated.44

According to the Cuban leader, the preliminary investigation had proceeded with caution and discretion. It was an attempt to not publicize the operation; there had also been some concern about Ochoa's possible escape from Cuba. However, Ochoa, it was delicately explained, was not arrested only to keep him from defecting. Even so, keeping tabs on him became

 

a headache for us, because of the precedent set by people who were corrupt and later fled, and became heroes of the other side; then they became parrots and repeated everything the imperialists put in their mouths.[45]

Fidel Castro declared that while they had become aware of certain irregularities, the Cuban authorities "were unaware of others. For example, the money in Panama, the account, nothing of that was known at that time." At some point, Div. Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frias was asked to return to Cuba from Angola. "We wanted him to give us some information about all this. We wanted to know whether he knew anything about it."

On 11 June the investigators reportedly met for a period of fourteen hours, in part to examine documents "proving" that Diocles Torralba had been involved in some of the same activities. In addition, "those documents were irrefutable and unquestionable evidence of the immoralities in which Ochoa and one of the de la Guardia brothers were involved." Moreover, it appears that Gen. Cintra Frias may have provided a key piece to the puzzle Fidel Castro and his team were trying to put together. "We learned important facts from our conversation with Polo [Cintra Frias]. We had been unaware of those facts."

The Decision to Arrest. Fidel and Raul Castro's explanations portray the Cuban authorities as unaware of Ochoa's involvement in any compromising activities, whether drug-related or not. Such an assessment must be based upon an assumption that relations with drug traffickers were not officially sanctioned or that some of the operations that had been a matter of official policy had gotten out of control. Regardless, based upon those explanations offered by the Castros, little or nothing points to the involvement of Ochoa in drug trafficking prior to his arrest.

The decision to arrest Ochoa, Antonio de la Guardia, and the other defendants was deliberated upon at length. In Raul Castro's 14 June speech:

 

On the regrettable and, in many ways, enlightening...[changes thought]...because all problems and misfortunes can bring something positive, and we had to see what was more positive, considering it was Ochoa, for this and that, etc. We will see if we should have taken other kinds of measures or have done what we are doing. All [of us] generals who analyzed this matter asked ourselves if we should make a proposal to the commander in chief.... We analyzed this even on Sunday during a meeting we held after President Solis Palma's plane took off at 1600.

Gentlemen, we met for 14 hours. Even on Sunday, the commander-in-chief and us [sic] were devising a formula for leaving him at the FAR without any particular responsibility--for him to stay as my adviser, not in the army. But what happens is that events begin to unravel and some underlings begin to talk.[46]

In the end, it was decided to arrest the general. Fidel Castro explained once again during his Council of State address that keeping track of Ochoa was difficult, even under the twenty-four hour surveillance that had been placed upon him. "Sometimes he disappeared for two hours around the Santa Fe area. We thought perhaps he might get on a boat or something, because nobody knew what he could do." According to Fidel Castro, the de la Guardia brothers were arrested because of their operations in Angola and their link with Ochoa: "We arrested the de la Guardias for their participation in ivory and diamond smuggling. That is why we arrested them." Castro added that "On 12 June, we arrested them, and on the following night, we already had the main information about the drug case."47

The Trials

General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez and the thirteen other defendants formally charged in the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair were put through two trials. The first was a Military Honor Court that began on 25 July and in which forty-seven of the FAR's general officers participated. This court indicted Ochoa and the others of crimes against the state and the principles of the Revolution, proceeded to strip them of their military ranks, withdrew their various awards and decorations, and then expelled them from the PCC. The Honor Court also recommended penalties which, in the case of Ochoa, was the maximum penalty under Cuban law. The second trial, beginning on 30 June, was the formal Special Military Tribunal that conducted the court martial. This court formally determined the guilt of the defendants and declared the sentences.

Military Honor Court--Ochoa's Testimony. The Honor Court session enabled the government to lay out its case against the defendants and query them about how and why they had (allegedly) become involved in the several corrupt activities, including drug trafficking. In reading the trial transcripts made public, the most condemning evidence seems to come from the defendants themselves. Even so, it appears that much of the testimony was casual or incidental to the ultimate goal or outcome of the trial. In the end, all of the general officers present were given an opportunity to join, perhaps reluctantly, in the condemnation of the defendants.

It was at this trial that Gen. Ochoa "confessed" his involvement and assumed full responsibility for all transgressions. According to Antonio de la Guardia Font, the subject of money, drugs, and other matters that had been discussed with Ochoa in Angola were characterized as routine interchanges: "The topic first emerged as a normal, mundane conversation. It was just a commentary."[48]

General Ochoa's testimony took a much broader thesis, however. In his opening statement, while attempting to absolve the Castros and other officials, Ochoa searched for an explanation of the whole affair and pondered his own confusion as to why he had become involved:

 

My main concern in this has not been for me but for the Revolution...neither the commander-in-chief nor the minister, the party, the government, nor anyone in the Armed Forces ever had anything to do with this. All of this was my doing and I want to assume this responsibility before all of you.... I do not want to clarify my motives here, explain what motivated me. I think that is unimportant.... l do believe that one does something like this for a reason and because of something in one's life. I would say it starts to happen when one is given an order and ends up thinking that the higher command is a poor order, no? Once thinking along these lines, one begins to think independently and begins to believe that one is right and then one morally justifies the terrible things one commits, no? I can give you an example. The truth is here. Otherwise, how could I have justified this to myself at a certain time, no? Yes?

Today the one who speaks here, with everything that has happened, does not have the slightest doubt. Modest as it may be, regardless of the decision taken against me, you may be certain that I will continue to be a revolutionary and clean and clean....

When the minister [Raœl Castro] called me--I think that is when it began to happen. He called me twice--I should admit I lied to him and I wasn't brave enough to confront this, not confront the minister, but to confront the things that I had to tell him. When I decided to do so, there was no more time.

Even though you may not believe me today, I am another person. I despise myself and have no reason to live. I do not expect anything else.[49]

Once Ochoa had stepped down from the witness stand the mixture of eulogies and condemnation offered by nearly the entire FAR general officer corps began. "Greek chorus" may not be the appropriate analogy, but each of the general's statements responded to the government's allegations and Ochoa's testimony in a similar fashion. For example, Div. Gen. Raul Menendez Tomassevich expressed his "great admiration and respect for Ochoa.... He bravely defended the cause of his people and that of other peoples who, as Che would say, required our modest efforts." On the other hand, Adm. Aldo Santamaria, who was indicted by a Miami federal grand jury in 1982 for his role in smuggling drugs into the United States, stated that Ochoa's offenses were "conceivable and unacceptable in a revolutionary."

Other generals, such as Div. Gen. Rogelio Acevedo Gonzalez, fell upon the nature of Ochoa's personality and character:

 

Like many people here, I knew that there were shortcomings in Ochoa's personality, but I was inclined to justify those shortcomings, attributing them to his character.... No one knew how much Ochoa had gradually changed from being the revolutionary he was some years ago.... This is not the revolutionary Ochoa I admired, loved, and respected.[50]

Once the commentaries by the FAR generals were finished, Ochoa was given another chance to address the Honor Court. At this point Ochoa, in essence, exonerates his former colleagues at arms saying that he would

 

uphold the attitude of a FAR general, to its ultimate consequences. Second...I do not harbor any hard feelings over what has been said here. l agree with everything that has been said up to this moment.... As I said yesterday, I firmly and conscientiously believe I am guilty. If I can serve further, even as a bad example, I am at the service of the Revolution.[51]

The Court Martial Prosecutor and Ochoa. The oral hearing of the Special Military Tribunal for case No. 1 of 1989 began on 30 June. The court martial judges were Div. Gens. Ramon Espinsoa Martin, Julio Casas Regueiro, and Fabian Escalante Font.[52]

The lengthy trial included several dramatic moments with many of the defendants weeping under the pressure of the last several weeks as well as the public shame many must have experienced. The high moment for Gen. Ochoa came in his interchanges with the state prosecutor, Brig. Gen. Juan Escalona Reguera, who was at that time Cuba's Minister of Justice.

At one point, the prosecutor asked Ochoa about his awareness of "Tony" de la Guardia's group and its involvement in drug trafficking:

 

I was not aware of that. Tony never told me he was engaged in drug trafficking operations. He told me about the tobacco operation, the art objects operation, and the most recent operation.. However, he never told me that he was involved in drug trafficking operations here.[53]

Ochoa added that Capt. Martinez had been sent to de la Guardia because of the latter's already established foreign contacts. He also expressed that it was not his intention to traffic drugs through Cuba; rather Ochoa had "requested assistance abroad, basically in Panama, with some business contacts he [de la Guardia] had there."

During the testimony, it was not always clear who was leading whom through the questions and answers. The prosecutor Escalona asked Ochoa about the reasons why he directed his assistant, Capt. Martinez, to distance himself from Tony de la Guardia, Ochoa explained that "our objective was to involve ourselves in big businesses, not small ones."

At another point, Ochoa assessed the idea of Cuba's involvement in the drug trade:

 

I want the audience here, especially the tribunal, to know--and in saying this, I do not want to deny any responsibility--[that] I believe the involvement of a Cuban in drug trafficking to be bad whether it is in Cuba or abroad...more so if the person involved is a member of the Cuban government, and even more so if the person is a member of the Armed Forces.[54]

Much of the interchange between the prosecutor and Ochoa dealt with the establishment of a numbered bank account in Panama. The account held as much as $200,000, the funds coming from Nicaraguan sources, Cuba, and associated profits from dealings with the Angolans. Ochoa consistently claimed he had "intended to use the money...sent to Panama...for the Army...." He was asked later by the prosecutor about his authority to set up the bank account and deposit funds into that account:[55]

[Escalona] Was Angola authorized....

[Ochoa interrupting] The truth is....

[Escalona continues]...was [authorization given for] the account, Angola, Nicaragua, the equipment....

[Ochoa interrupting] The Angolan transaction had been authorized....

[Escalona] I ask you again: Was it part of your duty as mission com- mander? Where were you empowered to do this....

[Ochoa interrupting] I authorized....

[Escalona continues] without authorization from the command in Cuba?

[Ochoa] I did many things without authorization. I believe that in this case it was not illogical to do so.

[Escalona] What explanation can you give us to justify your actions?

[Ochoa] I must say that under the current circumstances it would be very difficult to say why I acted the way I did. That is the truth. I did not act with flippancy; perhaps I acted irresponsibly. I may have overstepped my authority and rights. I believe that there are things in life that make a man change; a man changes for many reasons. Perhaps the opportunity to operate independently also had a bearing on this.

During this testimony, the reference to arms trading emerged:

[Ochoa] I do not know how long after...I left Nicaragua, Martinez continued to make trips to see if he could help them get the weapons they wanted.

[Escalona] Were there any problems with that?

[Ochoa] I would rather not explain....

[Escalona interrupting] Ochoa, do you think the Nicaraguans may think we wanted to keep that money? As a matter of fact, we have kept that money.

[Ochoa] No, no, no. The Nicaraguans may think that I wanted to keep the money, but not you [Cuba].

Prosecutor Escalona then focused on how the monies were handled in the several officially approved operations as well as in the alleged ' unauthorized" activities. In reference to the procedures in Angola:

[Escalona] Who handled that money?

[Ochoa] Finance.

[Escalona] Ochoa, these figures were provided by finance.

[Ochoa] Right, finance handled the money. I did not handle money.

[Escalona] And who controlled finance?

[Ochoa] Mmmm, well.

[Escalona] [Words indistinct] De la Guardia?

[Ochoa] Well yes, we handled finance for a long time.

[Escalona] Ochoa, when you were looking for kwanzas to build the airport, you created a number of commercial mechanisms?

[Ochoa] We cannot talk about mechanisms.

The prosecutor then queried Ochoa about why he had betrayed his country, the Revolution, his comrades:

[Escalona] I feel bewildered.

[Ochoa] Why?

[Escalona] Because I have known you for many, many years. I have seen you command the Armed Forces' eastern, central, and western armies. I have seen you conduct operations, command exercises, and lead troops. I know of your feats in Ethiopia. I know that things you have done. And I ask myself, is it possible that such a man could turn into a perfectly irresponsible person? I ask you, are you the same Ochoa who was in Ethiopia?

[Ochoa] Possibly not.

Ochoa's defense lawyer was then given a chance to question the defendant:

[Toste] I want you to tell the court what you have learned from all this.

[Ochoa] I...[changes thought] The first thing I must say is that I believe that at day one time or another I detracted from the real objectives of the Revolution. I think that is what happened. I have thought about this a lot. I cannot say I have reached a final conclusion yet.... I can also tell you there was a time in my military life when I felt very tired. In other words, objectively speaking, I was not the same man who, as the prosecutor said, once headed and directed combat actions. I even felt like a dull person.

[Toste] Did you act out of selfishness, greed, or for any other reason, even though it may have been wrong?

[Ochoa] Even though I said the evidence is against me, those who know me and those who know how I live, know that I have never been selfish or greedy. That is the truth. I may have been irresponsible and a libertine, but those who know me. know how I live.

When Ochoa was asked about the international impact of the scandal, he seemed to have been waiting for such a moment. He specified that he had seen some newscasts of Telemundo on the U.S. Cable News Network:

[Escalona] They said you had taken drugs here at the Tribunal. [Ochoa] Yes, and by the way, I saw a very intelligent psychologist, who even pointed out, at a U.S. university, the type of drug I had been given. Yes I saw it. He is a very intelligent man. Actually, what are they saying there? That there are political problems, that there is a military uprising in Cuba, that there is sedition, that there is a rebellion in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and un the Interior Ministry, that there are more internal divisions within the party. [It is not certain whether Ochoa actually saw this particular event or was told that this had transpired.]

[Ochoa] Right, right. They also said there is a struggle between the old and new generations, and they said that Castro is purging the country.

[Ochoa] How can anybody say that I was drugged and then taken before the Military Honor Tribunal? I can tell you all that if shame is a drug, then I was drugged. The truth is that all this has represented great shame for

[Escalona] Ochoa, I only wanted to know whether those internal activities that you have not wanted to discuss or provide an explanation for...were going on while you were thinking of the possibility of conducting great operations involving millions of pesos and while you had 50,000 men fighting in Angola?

[Ochoa] Yes, and I worked on those activities.

A second defense lawyer questioned Ochoa about some of the Angolan commercial operations:

[Aymeriche] ...You said the deals in the black market were basically linked to two objectives or in fact to one basic goal. You wanted to obtain both foreign exchange and Angolan currency to build an airport un Angola.

[Ochoa] Yes.

[Aymeriche] I would like you to tell this tribunal whether that is the way you began operations with a number of officers, including Rodriguez Estupiñán?

[Ochoa] Those 100 tons of sugar were sold with the intention of building an airport. In other words, that was the only goal we pursued with that sale. Let me remind you that there were other deals there that have always gone on in Angola. The Military Honor Tribunal, however, linked one thing with the other. Those deals were something else, and it is not fair to establish a link between them. Those deals were something else. The department of finance was in charge of those deals. That was something different.

The Prosecutor's Summation. Brigadier Gen. Escalona's closing remarks at the court martial focused upon the gravity of Ochoa's actions:

 

As of the moment of Ochoa's arrest, when the first results of the investigations were obtained, it became evident that we were confronted with a crime of treason. . .a crime of high treason committed against the fatherland, against the people, against his superiors, and against the very idea of what a revolutionary, a military chief, and a Cuban internationalist fighter really is.[56]

Escalona referred to the "delicate situation" that was negatively affecting the prestige of the Revolution and its international credibility. The prosecutor suggested that Ochoa's transgressions against the Revolution came about because he had separated himself from Cuban society in order to fulfill his own personal desires. It was that path, and the desire "to obtain money quickly and in fabulous amounts" which led to the "unfortunate path of narcotics trafficking."

In what appeared to be an attempt to diffuse speculation about why Ochoa and the other defendants acted the way they did, Prosecutor Escalona concluded that

 

In his blindness, the enemy reached the senseless conclusion that Ochoa and even the other defendants had political motivations. Ochoa...and all of the others, fall into the simple category of common criminals, and nothing more has to be said.[57]

The Council of State--Fidel Speaks Out. The final step in the process leading to the execution of Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez was the 9 July 1989 meeting of the Council of State. The event, broadcast on Cuban television, featured statements from many, if not all, of the council members.

The most illuminating presentation came from Fidel Castro. This was the Cuban leader's only major public address on the whole Ochoa-de la Guardia affair. In the presentation, Castro revealed details of the policy conflicts over Angola between he and Gen. Ochoa in the field. Other questions were aired as well, giving the outside world yet another glimpse into the myriad activities that apparently were part of the covert network of arms and technology transfers.[58]

The Council of State session also allowed Fidel Castro to present his overarching analysis of the whole scandalous and admittedly embarrassing affair. The question is then raised, "To what extent did Castro reconstruct or distort Ochoa's activities?"

Also, to what extent did Ochoa's activities in Angola exceed those of previous commanders? In a series of interviews broadcast on Radio Marti in June-July 1989, former Cuban Brig. Gen. Rafael del Pino explained that the usual headquarters of the Cuban commander in Angola were located in Luanda, from where the officer would visit the field. More telling, however, were del Pino's remarks that the Cuban government had been shipping diamonds, ivory, quartz, and other materials to markets in Europe since at least 1978. Cuba had used front companies such as ETCO, TAINO, and TOYO to carry out such transactions.

Be that as it may, it is clear that the purpose and outcome of the session was never in doubt: to reaffirm the death sentence for Ochoa that had been handed down by the Special Military Tribunal. This course of action was to be taken in the face of public sentiment against executing the famous and popular general. The Cuban leader ingenuously addressed the question of arms transfers, suggesting he was unaware of the reasons and means for conducting such activities:

 

There is something else--we did not know why Ochoa sent arms from Angola to Panama. We said to ourselves "That is strange. Why did he send...rifles to that country?" [Corrects himself] Excuse me, I meant to say from Angola to Nicaragua. We asked ourselves: what does that mean? We were unable to come up with an answer.

In reference to the "drug mafia" and the MC group and their relations with Ochoa:

 

Undoubtedly, when these people saw Ochoa return from Angola-- Ochoa who was on his way to becoming commander of the Western Army, Ochoa, who demanded as a defense necessity that the DAAFAR [Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force] and the Western Navy be assigned to him, as is the case with the eastern region--[they] must have felt they were the people with the most impunity in the world. It must have upset them a great deal that a member of the Central Committee, a hero, a division general, and a man with Ochoa's prestige was involved in this.[59]

Despite the difficulties, Ochoa did not let up.... He had plans to carry out operations [drugs?] until April 1989. We learned this from all the evidence we have gathered. He persisted in the idea of large-scale operations.... He talked a lot with Tony de la Guardia.... He argued a lot with Tony de la Guardia about all these problems. He kept insisting on it; it was an idea, which if we look at it, was totally crazy.[60]

Yet while making his case against Ochoa-s involvement in unauthorized activities and his eventual involvement with drugs, Fidel Castro admitted that "naturally, when Ochoa returned from Angola [January 1989], very few things were known about him."

It seems that for Fidel and Raul Castro, the issue of Ochoa not revealing the "illegal" activities and not confessing to his involvement was a point of contention. It became a rationale for not backing away from supporting the death sentence:

 

Ochoa could have saved himself in the first conversation he held with Raul if he had been frank, open, sincere, responsible, and truthful.... Of course, Ochoa could not have remained in the Armed Forces, but had he rendered this service, we could even have discussed whether to take him to court or not. Just imagine! We could have discussed it.... He did not have this attitude. He did not cooperate in any way. We had to inquire, investigate, and work hard to discover everything without Ochoa's cooperation.[61]

Fidel Castro then praised the historical and founding role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. His purpose may have been to reinforce the FAR's institutional role in the wake of the Ochoa case as well as to reward the FAR for accepting the price of Ochoa's downfall. Castro recounted that the Ministry of the Interior had been created from the rebel army, which had become the FAR. He indicated that the FAR now had to help the Ministry of the Interior once again:

 

If there is an institution that has been demanding in this country, if there is an institution that has set standards, if there has been an institution that has set standards [sic], if there has been an institution that has been, par excellence, an educative institution in this country, it has been the FAR

Castro added:

If there is a comrade who has been a struggler and made demands, that comrade is Raul.... That is why we must indignantly deny the suggestion coming from the enemy [which is] that if there was change in the Ministry of the Interior, there must also have been change in the FAR.[62]

Ochoa's Behavior. In the entire process, one question that seems to linger concerns the behavior of Gen. Ochoa. If Ochoa, as portrayed, was flippant, irreverent, and challenging in his conduct; if Ochoa had been warned about his behavior by colleagues and by his superiors; why then did this particular person "confess" his "crimes" and assume full responsibility for his actions, many of which had been part of official policy? One answer may be that Ochoa did stray from official policy and did indeed endanger the Revolution through his activities. In realizing this, the general and son of the Revolution accepted his fate and eventually cooperated with the authorities in order to defend the integrity of the Revolution and its highest leadership. This answer is bolstered by the assessment that Ochoa was a dedicated professional whose life had been shaped and rewarded by the Revolution. His sense of nationalism supported his actions in favor of the Revolution. In the end, for him to confess and assume responsibility was the ultimate revolutionary act.

Another answer to the question posed above departs from a different premise, i.e., in return for collaborating with the investigation and conducting himself properly during the publicized trials, Ochoa, knowing that he would be executed in any case, traded his image and self-esteem for the well-being of his family and children:

 

Oh, with the children. I did nothing more with my children than state the truth, did I? I took responsibility for the events. It was important to me that the children should not have to suffer at all for the mistakes of their father. I didn't want them to hear of this in a distorted way. There is no doubt that I have not passed this negative influence down to my children during their lifetimes. On the contrary I have educated them within the principles of the Revolution and my children believe in me. It was important to me to clarify all the responsibility I have for these events.[63]

The Political Questions

Any analysis of the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair is significantly dependent upon the information made available by the Cuban government; as such, any analysis risks being, or becoming, a parody of the "theater" that occurred in Cuba during June and July 1989. Even so, the television and radio broadcasts of proceedings and documentaries did provide outside observers a rare intimate view of the Cuban political system.

The premise of this particular analysis lies in the admission that Gen. Ochoa was investigated, surveilled, and arrested before many of his supposed illegal and treasonous activities were discovered, not to mention his alleged connections with narcotics trafficking. Among the many issues deriving from the Ochoa case, the haunting question is, "Why was Ochoa arrested in the first place?"

Whether or not that question can be answered, it can be said that Cuba's political system experienced a traumatic jolt in mid-1989. Certainly, in the aftermath, the Ministry of Interior has been impacted severely as an institution. It is less clear what the ramifications have been within the Revolutionary Armed Forces although, on the surface, it could be said that the FAR has returned as a dominant force within the Cuban political system. In the context of the Cuban revolutionary experience under Fidel Castro's orchestration, little if anything is ever presented in a straightforward fashion. Regardless, the occasion demands an attempt to address the several issues and the puzzling question posed.

Moral Deterioration: The Painful Process. One aspect that emerged during the whole affair was a sense of betrayal, disbelief, and anger. It is certain that many expressed their emotions during the proceedings. Even Prosecutor Escalona demonstrated his exasperation over how Ochoa [ergo Cuba] could become entangled in such a situation. At the same time, it is probable that Fidel Castro (and his brother Raul) utilized natural reactions to the Ochoa case to further the sense of shame. This whole process could then be more useful in Fidel's reassertion of ideological control over anyone that may be tempted to stray from the revolutionary path.

Many among Cuba's governing elite and the FAR high command seemed to be uneasy and quiescent. Many expressed feelings that the whole experience was painful and disillusioning. The trauma may have been most widespread in the few days after Ochoa's arrest had been announced. MINFAR Minister Raul Castro noted during his 14 June speech that

 

there are many feelings about the case of comrade Ochoa. [The Military Honor Court]...will first of all consider the nature and the consequences of his behavior which are incompatible with the principles of a communist and with the higher obligations to the nation, people, and party. Above all, it is behavior which is incompatible with the highest ethics of a general of our Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Castro, philosophizing on the meaning of service and honors in the military, revealed his own feelings and presumably reflected those within the FAR officer corps as well:

 

Each star worn on his chest represents thousands of comrades who were under his command--they sweated or bled fulfilling that mission. Here, no one can have individual prestige. Our prestige is owed to the blood and sweat of someone else, and of course to our own efforts, work.[64]

What is this all about? What is this idea of feeling above others? Although apparently...even if one has populist politics, etc. We reflect...these are the issues. What happened with Ochoa?.... What happened with Diocles [Torralba Gonzalez]?[65]

General Castro then gave the careers of "Polito" (Div. Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frias) and "Pardito" (Div. Gen. Ramon Pardo Guerra) as proper examples of FAR officer conduct and behavior. In contrast to Ochoa, they "are men and leaders who don't get dizzy with glory. They do not become foolish and think that they are overly gifted." FAR officers should "not be gossiping like Ochoa was doing." Offering advice which he had given at a party meeting earlier in the year, Castro suggested that

 

the principle of being a FAR officer is not a way of life, but rather a sense of life. It includes the determination to sacrifice life with dignity and honor against the enemies of the fatherland.[66]

In the Granma editorial of 22 June (at which point the narcotics issues had been folded into the government's case), the arrests continued to buffet the body politic. The case in question demonstrated:

 

to what extent a consumer society and its imitators are capable of dazzling and influencing certain people. To what point is it necessary to elevate vigilance, exigency, and revolutionary awareness? But we will tear out the bad by its roots. We are the only ones in this hemisphere who are able to do this, and it will not even be a difficult task. Our citizens, our Border Guard, MINFAR, and MININT combatants, and the cadres of our party will be much more alert now. What they have done is an act of treason against officials and combatants of our FAR and combatants of the Interior Ministry who have written so many glorious pages in defense of the Revolution.[67]

In a news summary of Raul Castro's report to the Military Honor Court, the minister of defense emphasized to the generals who were participating in the Honor Court the need for actions that would erase the shame brought upon Cuba by Ochoa: "Comrade generals, let us exemplarily wash away this outrage to which Arnaldo Ochoa has subjected our fatherland, the party, and the FAR.[68]

Another facet of this expressed sense of outrage focused upon what was termed Ochoa's "departure" from revolutionary values and his "obsessive" desire to engage in illicit operations in Angola. A Prensa Latina article stated that "his role models were no longer the most devoted cadres of the Revolution or the humble men under his command" and that there were "fears that he might desert."[69]

In the Honor Court, Div. Gen. Fernandez Gondin commented on the same theme:

 

only by separating himself more and more from our codes of conduct was Ochoa able to get close to that goal [i.e., businessman]. That is why it is not unusual that he completely scorns political activities. The activities of the party were basically a nuisance to him.[70]

Most of the statements made by the general officer corps at the Military Honor Court followed a similar pattern, not unexpected given the circumstances. In their testimonies, different points about betrayal, violation of revolutionary values, embarrassment, and even sadness emerged. It was said that Ochoa had lost his sense of loyalty and that the responsibility of keeping Ochoa in line fell in part upon them and the party. To what degree the generals were reacting as comrades and individuals or as characters on the stage may never be determined. Perhaps in some cases the expressions contained elements of both:

 

I admired Ochoa throughout all those years...we felt happy about Venezuela...we felt proud of Ochoa.... The day we were informed of Ochoa's activities.... I also felt ashamed of being Ochoa's comrade. He betrayed us all. He betrayed Camilo. He betrayed Che.

We have undergone bitter times of grief, shame, and indignation because of the serious mistakes made by Ochoa and the group of guards.... He had virtues as well as deficiencies and had liberal views. We are all aware of this.... It never entered my mind, however, that Ochoa could be transformed as he was. I never imagined that a comrade with a background and attitude like his could mar our revolution and the Armed Forces.[71]

Another general indicated the degree of ostracism and disgust that may have been also shared by Ochoa's former colleagues:

 

I saw how he crumbled, [became] demoralized, and how he dragged some of our officers into that kind of activity. I think that men like Ochoa deserve no respect from our society. "However, we have said that these are difficult, painful and bitter moments.[72]

The state prosecutor at the Military Tribunal, Brig. Gen. Escalona, attempted to cast Ochoa as a nonentity:

 

We went around in circles until this trial disclosed that this Ochoa [i.e., Ochoa the revolutionary] does not exist, that Ochoa destroyed himself until he dissolved into the grotesque caricature that we have had before us every day. That Ochoa does not exist because, as he himself said in a moment of honesty, he became tired.[73]

The prosecutor's remarks suggest yet another way of viewing Ochoa's situation: that is, Ochoa did get tired, that he ceased to dissimulate, that he just stopped pretending. At the very least he may have expressed his cynicism about the appropriateness of Cuba's policies, especially in overseas actions. This attitude, communicated through Ochoa's "joking" or flippancy, may have also been directed at issues related to political tensions generated by the conflict between Fidel Castro's Rectification and Michail Gorbachev's perestroika.

It was implied that Diocles Torralba may have held and expressed similar attitudes. In other words, both Ochoa and Torralba dropped the mask; both '-got tired' of it all. Such a view is plausible even if the conclusion reached by prosecutor Escalona is not accepted, i.e., Ochoa's fatigue and boredom led him to choose "other models and other paths...the path of easy money, that of drug trafficking."[74]

This phenomenon of "losing" revolutionary values, spirit, and dedication, this problem of moral deterioration was addressed at length by Minister of Culture Armando Hart at the Council of State meeting. The Revolution was not made "for those who tarnish its highest symbols and cut its deepest roots not to be sanctioned with death." But a very basic problem had to be corrected. In light of the scandal produced by the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair, Minister Hart outlined what might be construed as a blueprint for future ideological campaigns in Cuba:

 

Our only alternative is to increase our demands, to strengthen our moral standards.... The ethical formation of society is not a simple problem of a legal and political framework. It covers pedagogic and cultural aspects in which the family, the school, and political and social institutions play a role. Lastly, Comrade Fidel, with the infinite admiration of all, I want to salute you, our commander-in-chief, Army General Raul Castro, our glorious Revolutionary Armed Forces, and its generals. Once again, during these days you made us relive the immortal spirit of the Sierra Maestra. It appeared, and so l felt when the military honor tribunal was un session, that at this singular moment, Cuba had to go to the source of its own history, of its own morals, to the deepest roots of the Cuban Revolution to resolve such a complicated problem.... It is necessary to think how our problems of today and of any other nature are also resolved by returning to the moral and historical course of the revolutionary fighters of the Sierra Maestra and to the even deeper essence of the ethics of Marti and you, Comrade Fidel.[75]

On the other hand, Ochoa's former colleague, Gen. del Pino, in remarks broadcast on Radio Martí, described Ochoa as having earned his rank, status, and prestige, in contrast to many generals who had been promoted based on personal favoritism. Ochoa was portrayed by del Pino as a military leader who stood among his troops and demonstrated his concern for their problems. It may have been in this context that Ochoa's '-popularity" among the ranks was perceived as dangerous by the Castros.

Rewriting the Angolan War. One of the presumed tasks that Fidel and Raúl Castro had to accomplish in making their case against Ochoa was to discredit his military capabilities in Angola. This began during Raúl Castro's speech to the Western Army shortly after Ochoa's detention. The audience was informed that in truth it was Div. Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frias who was in the field directing the victorious Cuban forces at Cuito Cuanavale and later along the Namibian border as commander of the Southern Front. Cintra Frias was said to have:

 

fulfilled completely, and with firmness and creativity, the decisions that, in coordination with the command of the FAPLA, were jointly adopted by Angola and Cuba. Those were decisions that were personally tended to by Commander-in-Chief Comrade Fidel, who sometimes worked up to 15 hours daily here in our Gen. Staff.[76]

Gen. Castro explained that Div. Gen. Ochoa had been sent to Angola in November 1987, when the situation in Cuito Cuanavale and southern Angola "started to get complicated.... It was a full mission. So, I called Ochoa." Yet he criticizes the mission, saying that Ochoa was never in Angola except in transit.

In essence, Fidel Castro was using the Council of State session to provide selective evidence against Div. Gen. Ochoa, implying that he was incompetent, derelict in his duty, and guilty of insubordination. The question here is to what degree the information released by the Cuban leader is authentic; it must be remembered that the information was only a selected portion of hundreds of cables, most of them not made public.

In his presentation to the Council of State, Fidel Castro opened some of the books on the last phase of the Angolan war, providing selected details of several communications between himself and the high command in Cuba and Ochoa in the field. The picture presented was one in which the Cuban leader and his field commander did not always agree on procedure or strategy.[77]

In November, Castro had sent his premier field general to Angola. In July 1989, the Cuban leader explains that

 

we already had Ochoa as chief. However we realized that the best man for that mission was not Ochoa. He was not the most adequate man for the mission because of his character, lack of sufficient knowledge about the Angolans, and of relations with the Angolans.... What we decided to do then was to send Polo as chief of the Southern Front 78

More telling, perhaps, is a series of cables from Castro to Ochoa in Angola which reflected the Cuban leader's pique:

 

I am very angry over your unexpected inexplicable ideas that clash with my concept of the struggle in the south against South Africa which is fundamental to solving the problems created in Angola. [20 December 1988].[79]

Castro indicated that several proposals made by Ochoa had been rejected, and appeared to be exasperated about the chain of command in Cuito Cuanavale and the apparent failure of Ochoa to clearly explain the situation in Angola.[80]

Castro's view of Div. Gen. Ochoa's performance in the field contradicts testimony given by Ochoa's military colleagues at the Military Honor Court. Brigadier Gen. Gustavo Chui Beltrán had been:

 

overjoyed to hear that we had won the war in Angola.... I was also filled with pride and admiration for our Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, who had won the war.... I really felt this way and was very happy and proud to work under him.[81]

Corruption and Official Policy. Yet another series of questions arises over the issue of whether Gen. Ochoa, Col. de la Guardia, and the other defendants were engaged in officially approved policies or had truly become corrupt. Throughout the testimonies and declarations made during the trials and in other fora, it was admitted that many of the operations were indeed official, at least to a certain point. The organization headed by Col. Antonio de la Guardia, the so-called MC Department, had as its mission to circumvent the U.S. embargo against Cuba. In his speech to the Western Army, Raúl Castro lauded those who were engaged in such processes, at least as long as they "followed proper procedures":

 

the people I call the saviors of the republic--they get involved and are serious. They say one must work find dollars, and save more Cuban pesos. Whatever their intentions are, they must do it in an orderly way. All businesses, any kind of business, even if authorized, if it goes beyond the established norm of financial control, sooner or later, will end up in corruption.[82]

General Ochoa, while performing his overseas missions, managed similar activities designed to fund a portion of Cuba's overseas activities as well as generate hard currency reserves. Thus the question is not whether FAR and other Cuban officials were engaged in such activities but whether they exceeded certain limits upon those activities. According to one Prensa Latina dispatch:

 

Although Ochoa had been criticized repeatedly for manifesting too much direct concern for economic matters in the various countries where he was posted, the deposed general had always justified his activities by saying he was looking out for Cuba's economic interests. He was always believed. In part, this belief was probably due to his own modest life-style...even waiting in line at the grocery store.[83]

But somehow, it was stated, Ochoa had "stepped out of line--way out of line." Does this mean that Ochoa had violated unspecified guidelines, or did he go beyond certain recognized limits? Fidel Castro, in his Council of State speech, paints a picture of Gen. Ochoa, Hero of the Republic, as being involved in selfish and unethical activities while Cuba was "inscribing the most glorious page in our history." The Cuban leader added:

 

How can one fight a war by gathering kwanzas? That was simply a pretext to cover up the theft of money and resources. This, unfortunately, is the truth; it is very sad, but it is the truth--the front's needs were used as an excuse. They were authorized to barter in the operation zones, but not to engage in black market activities. The operations zones were the cattle areas. Peasants had their herds there. However, because of the war, they had no resources. The peasants were not interested in money; they were interested in obtaining merchandise. Consequently, the command was authorized to barter in that area. It was legal and the Angolans knew that--everyone knew that. Bartering could be carried out on the battlefront. In the south, troops bartered sugar, salt, or any other foodstuffs for other things that the peasants had....What Ochoa did, in a subtle way, was to barter using the excuse that he had to solve problems or meet needs. He did this based on the idea that he was authorized to do so in the operations zones. It would not have been so bad if this money WAS to be used for the war, but that was not actually the case. Saying that this was done to help the troops was merely a pretext. It is possible that Ochoa turned in a few kwanzas.... We saw how the money from these operations wound up in Cuba and, from Cuba, in an account in Panama.[84]

A Challenge to Established Authority. Another explanation for Gen. Ochoa's execution has acquired a certain "conventional wisdom." This is the perceived political threat that Ochoa represented, if not actually posed, to the leadership of either Fidel or Raúl Castro. Under this rubric, the massive campaign to discredit Ochoa's military conduct, impugn his professional competence, associate him with narcotics trafficking, imply his corruption, and demonstrate his fall from revolutionary grace, all make sense. One commentary summarized the issue saying that

 

the trial and purge tell Cubans that Castro intends to continue having his way in domestic policies, whatever others may think. And it warns them that even the most honored of Cuban generals, a close and trusted friend, will be cut down mercilessly if he seems to be an actual or even potential rallying point for opposition forces.[85]

While the political opposition or conspiracy thesis may seem to be a logical explanation, a Venezuelan who allegedly was associated with Gen. Ochoa as a guerrilla in the 1960s suggested that

 

Ochoa was a loyal Fidelista and he didn't care much for the Soviets; and it would be unlikely that he, or any of the others, represented a restive group pushing for perestroika in Cuba.[86]

Nevertheless, another facet of the political opposition thesis suggests the possibility of Ochoa serving either as a leader or focal point for latent political opposition inside Cuba. Several generals at the Military Honor Court made statements that suggest that younger officers may view the Revolution differently than the Sierra Maestra veterans. "We knew him. We appreciated him. We thought he was a true revolutionary. To be honest, his example helped me be a firmer and more determined revolutionary." In addition, said Brig. Gen. Manuel Lastre Pacheco,

 

I am a young general.... I have always felt great affection for the older guerrillas, the invaders, the internationalists. I must say that I felt great admiration for Comrade Gen. Ochoa. When things were hot in Angola, I was sent there to be a member of the special forces. We worked hard, and I received assistance from Ochoa, based on his experience in Venezuela. In other words, it is not just the generals present here who felt affection for him; so did many members of the Armed forces. (Brig. Gen. Jose L. Mesa Delgado)

I am a young general. Perhaps I am the youngest general in this tribunal.... I was not a rebel army combatant.... [A]n important group of military chiefs greatly influenced my revolutionary education. I must say that Div. Gen. Ochoa played an important role in my revolutionary education.... His troops appreciated, admired, and respected him. Without overlooking his faults, we always respected and admired him.... He even imparted a certain mysticism that is necessary in our revolutionary education. Ochoa betrayed us all. (Brig. Gen. Leonardo Andollo Valdes)[87]

All the same, Gen. Ochoa's remarks about the possibility of a ' macrofaccion" in the FAR, even though made under dubious circumstances, leave room for speculation, though made under dubious circumstances-- about the possibility of a "macrofaccion" in the FAR:

 

There is no truth to their statements. I have never been opposed to the Revolution and I have nothing against the Revolution. On the contrary, everything is quite the opposite.

Conclusions

The Castro brothers and the controlled Cuban media, using a mixture of facts and unsubstantiated allegations, developed a thesis of corruption, illicit activities, and questions of immoral conduct. Many aspects of these charges or allegations were never specified publicly. It was implied that an investigation had been ordered prior to April or May of 1989; it was also admitted that little was known of the suspects' activities.

The outside observer, however, has even less knowledge about the motives of the defendants, or to what extent many of the activities described in the several trials were authorized or not. Indeed, it is possible that there were even grander strategic plans that may have involved both the Castro brothers and Gen. Ochoa . Ultimately, it may be years before more facts are revealed about the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair that may provide clearer explanations than those explored here.

The Cuban government emphatically denied that there were links between the Ochoa and the Torralba cases, despite the fact that both men were friends and appear to have adopted similar views. The suggestion that there were political problems or that the Ochoa case involved treason was even more emphatically denied. However, the Granma editorial of 16 June suggested that "bad conduct" always leads to "political" issues or treason. This reasoning may have eased the way for the charges of drug involvement ten days later. In early July, at the conclusion of trials, the case was characterized as a "crime of high treason."

A great deal of time was devoted to charges of violating procedures, regulations, and document controls. There was dramatic concern over the possibility of a FAR officer getting caught meeting with a leader of the so-called Colombian drug cartel, thus "staining the Revolution." During the proceedings, much of the testimony focused upon the sense of moral deterioration, the apparent loss of revolutionary values, and the failure to uphold the Revolution's code of purity. Underlying these concerns was what appears to be a feeling of "betrayal." If it is a valid assessment, this betrayal was compounded by an irritating factor, i.e., Ochoa's apparently equivocal manner, his living with a "mask."

Few, if any of these factors adequately explain why Gen. Ochoa was arrested in the first place, let alone why it was deemed necessary to execute the former hero of the Revolution. If the events were to check discontent, to counter a growing popularity of Ochoa within the military or were due to various policy conflicts, none would seem to demand an execution. Thus, what is left that might explain the traumatic actions that were taken by the Castros?

One concern expressed was the possibility of Gen. Ochoa defecting from Cuba. The information and insights which Ochoa may have been able to divulge could well have irreparably damaged the Cuban leadership. The outside observer cannot be certain that defection was ever an option for Ochoa or one considered by him. A first assumption would be that defecting was not likely, given Ochoa's nationalism and integration with the Revolution, but even that assumption can be disputed by the defection of Gen. del Pino.

Another explanation, of course, is the thesis that a network of dissident officers within the FAR had developed which may have presented a threat to either Fidel or Raúl Castro. This presumed "macrofacción" cannot be proven at this point. For one thing, at least publicly, there have been no other FAR offices prosecuted in connection with the Ochoa-de la Guardia cases. For another, there have been no defectors [as of November 1989] to indicate more widespread discontent within the armed forces or involvement of FAR offices in a political faction or conspiracy. If, however, the thesis of a "macrofacción" were supported by other evidence not released, it could well explain the elaborate proceedings, media exposure, and executions at dawn.


Notes

1. Cuba's national poet, Nicolás Guillén, died on Sunday, 16 July 1989, just three days after the execution of General Ochoa and three other former officers. His poem "Execution" was written during the 1930s (Cantos para soldados y sones para turistas, 1937). A mulatto, born in Camaguey in 1902, Guillén had been a communist since 1937. He left his law studies to devote himself to poetry, much of it providing expression of the black culture of Cuba.

2. Curiously, only three individuals from the FAR were publicly charged and prosecuted for involvement in corruption and drug trafficking. Col. Antonio Rodríguez Estupiñán was an assistant to Ochoa in Angola and received 8 ten-year sentence. The others who were prosecuted--Antonio de la Guardia and Amado Padrón--were from the Ministry of the Interior and received lengthy prison sentences. See El Nuevo Herald (Miami), 8 July 1989, pp. 1, 8.

3. Granma, 14 June 1989, p. 1. Also see Washington Times, IS June 1989, p. 1; and Washington Post, 17 June 1989, p. 1.

4. Washington Times, 16 June 1989, p. 6.

5. Granma Editorial, 16 June 1989, p. 1, summarized by FBIS-UT, 16 June 1989, p. 2.

6. Reuters, IS June 1989.

7. States News Service, 15 June 1989.

8. Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, "A Bit of Stalinism in Castro s Cuba," Chicago Tribune, 15 July 1989, p. 13.

9. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), in FBIS-UT, 20 June 1989, pp. 5-21. Raúl Castro had planned a simple, laudatory message to the Western Army. In the wake of Gen. Ochoa's arrest the locale of the speech was changed, ostensibly to accommodate the requests of Cuba's military officer corps to hear firsthand the MINFAR minister's assessment of the situation.

10. Ibid.

11. One explanation offered for Raúl Castro's performance on 14 June: "Raúl Castro was clearly both exhausted and emotionally overwrought when he made the announcement over national television." Havana Prensa Latina, 20 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 27 June 1989, pp. 2 1A.

12. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), in FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp.5-21. During the testimony given by Gen. Ochoa's high command colleagues, many generals praised Ochoa and singled out his key role in turning the Angolan situation around for Cuba. For example, see the testimony by Brig. Gens. Gustavo Chui Beltran and José L. Mesa Delgado in Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-UT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

13. Granma Editorial, 16 June 1989, p. 1., summarized by FBIS-UT, 16 June 1989, p. 2.

14. Granma Editorial, 16 June 1989, p. 1.

15. Ibid.

16. For treatment of the drug-trafficking aspects of the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair, see sect. II, "Foreign Affairs."

17. Granma Editorial, Radio Progreso Network (Havana), 22 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 23 June 1989, pp. 1-7.

18. Ibid. Through the various speeches and media stories, it has been reported that Martínez also traveled abroad in August, September, October, and November of 1988. In 1989, he made trips in February, in March, and in April--the last trip occurring on 28 April.

19. Granma Editorial, Radio Progreso Network (Havana), 22 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 23 June 1989, pp. 1-7.

20. Granma Editorial, Radio Progreso Network (Havana), 22 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 23 June 1989, pp. 1-7.

21. Ibid.

22. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-UT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

23. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 6 July 1989, in FBIS-UT, 11 July 1989, pp. 3-10.

24. Juventud Rebelde, 1 February and 13 October 1974; Verde Olivo, 24 August 1975, pp.8-11; Newsweek, 29 December 1975, pp.33-34; and Granma, 11 August 1977.

25. Verde Olivo, no. 41, 12 October 1980, p. 47; Granma, 30 September 1980, p. 4; Granma, I March 1981, p. 3; Juventud Rebelde, 27 December 1981, p. 5; and Verde Olivo, 4 March 1982, pp. 50-51; and 11 November 1982, p. 51

26. New York Times, 19 June 1983, p. 1; Washington Post, 20 June 1983, p. 4; and Notimex, 11 March 1986, in FBIS-LAT, 12 March 1986, p. Q3. In February 1986, then Div. Gen. Colomé Ibarra was made a member of the Politburo. Some observers mark this event as the beginning of Ochoa's political decline; however, Gen. Ochoa s military career remained solid and portended no disfavor with the Cuban leadership at that time.

27. Quarterly Situation Report, sect. IV, "Military Affairs," vol. III, no. 4 (October-December 1987); vol. IV, nos. 3 and 4 (July-October 1988).

28. See Granma, 3 January 1984, p. 3; and FBIS-LAT, 4 January 1984, p. Q2.

29. Ibid.

30. Domestic Radio and Television Network (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

31. Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, "A Bit of Stalinism in Castro's Cuba," Chicago Tribune, 15 July 1989, p, 13.

32. Havana Prensa Latina, 25 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 27 June 1989, pp. 6-9A.

33. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 15 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp. 5-21.

34. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

35. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

36. Havana Prensa Latina, 25 June 1989, un FBIS-LAT, 27 June 1989, pp. 4-6A.

37. Ibid.

38. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 15 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp. 5-21.

39. Ibid.

40. Havana Prensa Latina, 25 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 27 June 1989, pp. 4-6A.

41. Reuters, 23 June 1989.

42. Granma Editorial, Radio Progreso Network (Havana), 22 June 1989, in FBISLAT, 23 June 1989, pp. 1-7.

43. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. Fidel Castro was most likely referring to former Cuban officials Manuel Sánchez Pérez who defected in Madrid, Spain, and Brig. Gen. Rafael del Pino who had escaped to Key West, FL, in a small plane.

46. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 15 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp. 5-21.

47. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

48. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid. More than a third of the forty-seven generals present at the Military Honor Court praised Ochoa's professional qualities and revolutionary credentials before agreeing to recommend severe punishment for their former colleague. While some generals specified the death penality, others did not.

51. Ibid.

52. The defendants, now stripped of their military ranks yet still being tried by a military court, were Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez, Jorge Martínez Valdes, and Antonio Rodríguez Estupiñán, formerly of the FAR and former MININT officers Antonio de la Guardia Font, Amado Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sánchez Luma, Eduardo Díaz Izquierdo, Alexis Lago Arocha, Miguel Ruíz Poo, José Luis Pineda Bermúdez, Gabriel Prendes Gómez, Lionel Estevez Soto, Patricio de la Guardia Font, and the only woman, Rosa Maria Abiemo Gobin. Radio Rebelde Network (Havana), 1 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 30-31.

53. Cubavision Television Network (Havana), 30 June 1989, in FBIS-1.,1T, 6 July 1989, pp. 1-28.

54. Ibid.

55. Subsequent quotes are from the first session,30 June 1989, Cubavision Television Network (Havana), in FBIS-LAT, 6 July 1989, pp. 1-28.

56. Domestic Radio and Television Network (Havana), 6 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 11 July 1989, pp. 3-10.

57. Ibid.

58. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

59. Ibid. In an alleged reponse from the Nicaraguans to the Cuban government explaining the arms transfer, Ochoa, reportedly, had told the Sandinista Patriotic Army (EPS chief of staff (Maj. Gen. Joaquín Cuadra Lacayo) that he could supply Nicaragua with Western military equipment. On 12 March 1986 Cuadra Lacayo agreed with Ochoa to purchasc arms; he gave Ochoa $20,000 through Capt. Jorge Martínez Valdés. On 5 March 1987 Martínez received another $41,000. On 22 September 1988 Ochoa notified the EPS through Brig. Gen. Nestor López Cuba of the shipment of weapons from Angola. Fidel Castro commented that "they were stealing from everybody to increase their bank account. The money had not yet come from drugs."

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid. Raúl Castro indicated that Ochoa had had "the opportunity to leave his sons a self-appraisal that would help them understand...the unmistakable justice of the decisions of this court [Military Honor Court] and the court martial [Spccial Military Tribunal] that will bring him to trial."

62. Ibid.

63. As stated by Ochoa during the Military Honor Court, second session, Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31. This particular theme was presaged by MINFAR Minister Raúl Castro s suggestion that Ochoa's children would benefit from his "self-critical analysis and reflection.... In the future this will allow them to face life...with the understanding of this gesture." Tele-Rebelde Network (Havana),26 June 1989, in JPRS Report-LAM, 25 July 1989, p. 6.

64. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 15 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp. S-21.

65. Ibid.

66. See Cuban Situation Report, sect. IV, "Military Affairs," vol. V, no. 1 (January-April 1989).

67. Granma Editorial, Radio Progreso Network (Havana), 22 June 1989, in FBISLAT, 23 June 1989, pp. 1-7.

68. Havana Prensa Latina, 25 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 27 June 1989, pp. 6-9A.

69. Ibid., pp. 4-6A.

70. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 6 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 11 July 1989,pp. 3-10.

74. Ibid.

75. Domestic Radio and Telcvision Networks (Havana), 11 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 19 July 1989, pp. 1-22.

76. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 15 June 1989, un FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp. 5-21.

77. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

81. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

82. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 15 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 20 June 1989, pp.5-21. The 22 June Granma editorial explained the official policy related to the MC Department, i.e., it was responsible for acquiring needed equipment and supplies that were normally barred by the U.S. embargo. Radio Progreso Network (Havana), 22 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 23 June 1989, pp. 1-7.

83. Havana Prensa Latina, 20 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 27 June 1989, pp. 24A.

84. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 12 July 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 13 July 1989, pp. 1-26.

85. Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, "A Bit of Stalinism in Castro's Cuba," Chicago Tribune, 15 July 1989, p. 13.

86. Financial Times, 22 July 1989, p. 3.

87. Domestic Radio and Television Networks (Havana), 28 June 1989, in FBIS-LAT, 3 July 1989, pp. 3-31.

88. Ibid.

 

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