Cuban Armed Forces Review: High Command Reserve

Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces' High Command Reserve (Reserva del Alto Mando - RAM)¹ is composed of an armored division and all its firepower support units that form a defensive ring around the capital of Havana.

RAM is located in Managua military base near Havana and its mission in wartime consists of being combat ready when the Commander-in-Chief (Fidel Castro) orders their mobilization.

This counterattack force was created in the 1960s, based on the Soviet concept³of having an important reserve⁴ force to be thrust upon the direction, when detected, of an enemy's principal attack, and in which direction the enemy has concentrated his offensive. The reserve is often thought of as the commander's insurance against disaster, his primary means of retrieving a deteriorating battlefield situation. It is better to think of the reserve as the "Sunday Punch".⁵ In peacetime, the RAM is commanded by the Eastern Army Commander, Army Corps General Leopoldo 'Polo' Cintra Frias, -administratively subordinate to the commander, but not operative.

Salado in the West and Guanabo in the East. [Photo: NGS]

Defensive Counter-Landing of the Country Operation is the fundamental guide whereby all decisions are made in the defense command structure. The Commander-in-Chief sets general guidelines based on his ideas of how an invasion of Cuba would occur. In accordance to this plan, the United States--in an invasion of Cuba--would attempt to land toward the East or West of the capital, Havana, Salado in the West and Guanabo in the East by Santa Maria del Mar and Guanabo beaches in the East or in between Salado and Mariel in the West. Advancing toward the borders in the Operation would be Cuban divisions defending themselves, and with the mission to reject U.S. landing attempts. According to Fidel's idea, depending on which direction-East or West-of Havana, the U.S. obtains a major success in landing there; a heavy thrust would be staged by the FAR 1st Naval Infantry Division followed by the FAR 3rd Armored Division.

Fidel's strategic design is to have an elite unit with the most modern armored means and major firepower to be used after U.S. forces land, and where they introduce their principal forces.

According to a former US government official, the RAM was placed on alert during the "Maleconazo" of August 5, 1994 when hundreds of people spontaneously protested by the seawall in Havana known as the Malecón and adjacent streets, however, the protest was quickly quashed by the Cuban regime's security apparatus.

Cuban military commanders have probably closely studied the U.S. military campaign in Iraq, principally, U.S. tactics (that might be employed in a future combat scenario with Cuba) used to secure Baghdad⁶, which was protected by two defensive rings: regular Iraqi army, and three Republican Guard Armored Divisions (Medina to the south, Al Nida to the east and the Hammurabi to the west) which fell to the American armed forces' advance to Baghdad.

In mid-September, Jane's Intelligence Digest⁷ reported that the Ukraine is exporting military equipment (light infantry weapons coupled with small and medium sized military vehicles) to Cuba and Venezuela, with first shipments scheduled to take place sometime during September and October.

The exportation of military equipment to Cuba has thus generated speculation that Cuba's armed forces are attempting to modernize their equipment and therefore, the RAM will heavily benefit from such modernization, in which its capability is fortified as the regime's principle counterattack protection force.

1. Conversation with FAR Brigadier General Rafael del Pino (highest-ranking defector of the Cuban military), February 1, 2003; Discussion with a former U.S. Government official about the High Command Reserve, January 28, 2003.

2. Reference is made to this reserve force in the Defense Intelligence Agency Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces published in May, 1986 by the DIA's Directorate of Research.

3. See Edward H. Cabaniss IV, "Soviet Ground Tactics," Military Review (December 1979); Lester W. Grau, "Soviet Nonlinear Combat in Future Conflict," Military Review (December 1990); Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War," Military Review (September/October 1995).

4. The reserve plays a key role in both offensive and defensive operations. Historically, the reserve was frequently ignored, being held in readiness by the commander to be committed wherever he desired. Often the reserve was not given any mission except to be ready to march at a moment's notice to a threatened sector and try to shore up a weak spot in the line or reinforce an attack that was having difficulty. The proper role for the reserve is to be a force ready to exploit success or to be a counterattack force striking an attacker in his flank or rear after the enemy reaches its culminating point where it is most disorganized and least able to react. The reserve must therefore be ready to join the fray and carry out the aims of the commander. In order for this to happen, the reserve must be actively involved in all planning and must understand the intent of the commander. See "Expeditionary Warfare Staff Planning Course: Introduction to Maneuver Warfare." U.S. Navy - Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups (EWTGLANT).

5. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "Redefining Maneuver Warfare," Military Review (February 1992): 56.

6. "The use of defensive ring is part of a long-established Iraqi strategy, one that Iraq employed to protect Basra during its war with Iran and that Mr. [Saddam] Hussein talked about in a January speech to top military commanders." "If there is penetration of the outer ring, that will be overcome to a certain degree by better defenses dug by the "Golden Division," a Special Republican Guard unit that has orders to protect Saddam and high-value targets such as chemical and biological weapons." See Michael R. Gordon, "Iraq Strategy Is Seen as Delay and Urban Battle," New York Times, (February 16, 2003); Bill Gertz, "Two-layered defense for Baghdad," Washington Times (January 7, 2003); For an account on the destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard defensive rings, see PBS' Frontline program, The Invasion of Iraq: Taking on the Medina Division (February 26, 2004).

7. Jane's Intelligence Digest, "Ukraine arms Cuba and Venezuela," September 16, 2004.

Armando F. Mastrapa III is the editor and publisher of the Cuban Armed Forces Review Internet Web Site and Director of the Department of Research of La Nueva Cuba. He received a Master of Arts in Government and Politics from St. John's University (New York City). He has written extensively on international security matters and civil-military relations.

© Copyright 2004 Armando F. Mastrapa III. All Rights Reserved. Permission to reproduce, distribute, and/or quote from this work for non-profit, educational purposes is freely granted, always provided that proper reference to the author be included and that this notice accompany copies of a section or more of text. Reproduction and/or citation for profit and/or non-educational purposes is expressly forbidden without prior consent from the author.